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Investor-state arbitration: 
rationale and legitimacy
A reply to Christian Tietje
Attempts to conceptualize the foundations of and crucial 
questions around investment arbitration are most welcome, 
as the field gains not only public attention, but also 
increasing importance for investors as well as receivers. 
Christian Tietje, claiming in the title that investor-state 
arbitration is a part of the international rule of law and, 
therefore, a mechanism for upholding it, touches on what 
may surely be called a heated topic. Especially, as public and 
scholarly debate tends to be rather political in nature and 
especially, when authors, journalists, scholars and politicians 
take a rather critical stance. Indeed, the complexity of the 
issues surrounding investment arbitration (IA) and more 

specifically Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) are 
often not treated in sufficient depth to allow for informed 
assessments of their nature and consequences. Contrarily, 
controversies related to IA are not entirely new, as NAFTA 
and its investment-protection mechanism has sparked such 
debates for a number of years already, well beyond narrow 
circles of experts and people directly involved [see here and 
here]. Therefore, there might be value in pointing out that 
criticism has been there for quite some time and is much 
more nuanced than the author suggests. I would like to 
emphasize some of these issues, following the main approach 
chosen by Tietje by dividing the understanding of ISDS in its 
rationale and legitimacy.
The rationale of ISDS
In terms of the rationale, the differentiation between 
domestic and foreign citizens and entities – potentially 
leading to discriminatory treatment – is undoubtedly a 
strong reason for the existence of investment protection-
mechanisms based on treaties between states, and, 
therefore, international law. This notion may be looked at in 
some more detail, which provides some additional insight 
into the rationale: First, the differentiation between in- and 
outsiders concerning the application of domestic law is a 
basic concept of the “westphalian” nation-state. 
Discriminatory treatment (or, to use a positive terminology: 
preferential treatment for nationals) resulting from this is not 
at all unusual, but to a large extent reflects the legal and 
political normality. Especially in economic and trade law, the 
granting and commitment of non-discrimination is used as a 
specific political and legal tool to promote trade and improve 
and stabilize the conditions for economic exchanges and 
enhancing legal certainty for all participants – usually while 
reserving generous amounts of regulatory flexibility 
(sometimes referred to as “water”) between the 
commitments taken in international agreements and the 
actual regulatory situation (e.g. applied rules on transparency 
or actually applied capital caps or tariffs). Concerning 
investment, it is important to note that domestic and foreign 
investment are crucially different in that the second usually 
originates from economically stronger countries able to 
achieve the necessary surplus. This means that the normative 
concept of “leveling of the playing field” as suggested by Tietje 
is problematic, as – while it might reflect a situation which 
may be achieved e.g. between relatively well diversified and 
stable economies within the European common market – it 
implies an equality between actors that does not exist and 
also goes fairly beyond the scope of most existing investment 
protection agreements outside areas of regional integration 
[see here].
Second, the legal fiction of “juridical persons” which enjoy a 
certain amount of rights natural persons have within a legal 
system also originates in decisions of economic policy. As a 
concept, it is a utilitarian vehicle aimed at protecting the 
rights of people – natural persons – who act behind an entity 
like a company, limiting their liability. This makes a lot of 
sense in specific cases, but also needs to be regularly justified 
[see here]. While less disputed in economic law, where the 
legal forms of organization limiting risk are normal, these 
questions are, as Tietje points out, prevalent in legal fields 
which originate in the idea of conferring certain rights to 
human beings and protecting them.
The concept of “legal gap” articulated by Tietje is indeed valid 
to describe areas of uncertainty on the interface between 
domestic and international protection of rights and does to 
some extent constitute the rationale for ISDS. The actual 
breadth or extent of this gap, on the other hand, depends on 
the specifics of the regulatory environment we look at. 
Where natural and legal persons are seen as basically 
identical or at least very similar legal subjects in specific 
contexts, foreign legal persons may appear as being denied 
certain rights compared to the domestically established. This 
again may legitimate the establishment of a positive right to 
investment protection and ISDS as suggested by Tietje. It is 
very important to add – and even more important given the 
geographical expansion of global investment operations – 
that the inclusion of juridical persons into the scope of 
international human rights instruments remains and is 
probable to remain the global exception [see here]. The claim 
that arbitration, and specifically investment arbitration, 
constitutes an “exercise of individual freedom” in the sense of 
a basic (human) right is at the moment limited to 
developments in certain jurisdictions (namely European 
ones) and quite far away from being a universal concept.
All this said, the cited case of Tabbane v. Switzerland
(41069/12, judgment of 24 March 2016) is very interesting: 
First, the Court did see arbitration procedures as alone 
fulfilling the criteria of the right to a fair trial enshrined in 
Art. 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. But 
this, as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) states, 
is only the case under very specific conditions: the 
agreement to wave the possibility of having recourse through 
domestic courts must be fairly made, licit and unequivocal. 
An imbalance between parties, which in many cases enables 
one to impose terms on the other, is well recognized to 
influence such conditions negatively: As an example, the 
Oberlandesgericht (OLG) Munich questioned the legality of 
the Court of arbitration for sport (CAS) Lausanne as 
mentioned by Tietje. Also, – as an analogy – the Swiss 
Supreme Court found in Cañas (Decision of Swiss Supreme 
Court of 22 March 2007, 133 III 235) held, that athletes are 
not bound by waivers of recourse against awards, even if they 
satisfy the formal requirements of the federal law allowing 
for such waivers. The Swiss Supreme Court’s reasoning was 
that such a waiver cannot be deemed to have been freely 
made, given the obvious imbalances between the parties. The 
Swiss Federal Court as well as the ECtHR do recognize, that 
arbitration is only constituting a “fair trial” in human rights in 
the narrower sense of the word, when the circumstances 
surrounding the decision to waive fulfil high standards. As 
Tietje points out, the “insurance of equal rights” for both 
disputing parties is crucial. But – given the possible relations 
of dependence between important investors and receiving 
countries, the transposition of the Tabbane decision and the 
principle it reflects on international investment arbitration in 
general and particularly including parties outside of NAFTA 
and the EU is difficult.
The legitimacy of ISDS
Whereas the rationale behind ISDS may be explained and 
understood without entering the realm of politics, the issue 
of legitimacy is much more complex. It is closely linked to a 
concept which is notorious for being hard to grasp and even 
harder to effectively use in practice: sovereignty. As 
investment arbitration is not the “only enforceable means” of 
investment protection as suggested – there are domestic 
courts and complementary instruments like private and 
public insurances, specific contracts with the host country 
and the possibility of joint ventures – there must be also 
other reasons for its existence.
Conclusion
The raison d’être of international economic and trade law is 
to a large extent the creation of legal certainty. In a time 
where the mobility of capital is comparably high, uniform and 
reliable rules do indeed make the life easier for international 
investors and also for countries seeking to attract foreign 
investment. ISDS creates means to cope with the relative 
unpredictability of political decision-making and provides 
some increase in reliability and legal certainty. And while it 
does indeed not restrict the limits of the possible for political 
decisions as such – in principle, the sovereign rights of any 
state to change its domestic legislation are not impaired – it 
does potentially increase the potential cost of such changes 
for the public. The individual-rights-dimension of ISDS, 
therefore, does only tell half of the story, as they will 
continue to be perceived through their political 
characteristics.
Indeed, as Tietje points out, there is room but also are real 
prospects for improvement in ISDS. The United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)-rules as 
well as the UN-convention on Transparency in treaty-based 
Investor-State-Arbitration (ISA) might be a step in order to 
provide more transparency and acceptance, if more states 
actually relevant for international investment-flows would 
ratify them. Hopefully, some of the future Free-Trade-
agreement (FTA)- and investment-protection agreements 
(IPA)-practice will reflect suggestions made therein and 
move IA and ISDS out of the obscure light it is – often 
unjustified – put in.
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